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Abstract In his book Semantic Relationism, Kit Fine propounds an original and
sophisticated semantic theory called ‘semantic relationism’ or ‘relational seman-
tics’, whose peculiarity is the enrichment of Kaplan’s, Salmon’s and Soames’
Russellian semantics (more specifically, the semantic content of simple sentences
and the truth-conditions of belief reports) with coordination, ‘‘the very strongest
relation of synonymy or being semantically the same’’. In this paper, my goal is to
shed light on an undesirable result of semantic relationism: a report like ‘‘Tom
believes that Cicero is bald and Tom does not believe that Tully is bald’’ is correct
according to Fine’s provided truth-conditions of belief reports, but its semantic
content is (very likely) a contradiction. As I will argue in the paper, even the resort
to the notion of token proposition, introduced in Fine’s recent article ‘‘Comments on
Scott Soames’ ‘Coordination Problems’’’, does not suffice to convincingly eliminate
the contradiction; moreover, it raises new difficulties.
Keywords Semantic relationism  Coordination  Token propositions 
Belief reports  Contradiction
1 Preamble
In his book Semantic Relationism, Fine propounds an original and sophisticated
semantic theory called ‘semantic relationism’ or ‘relational semantics’, whose
peculiarity is the enrichment of Kaplan’s, Salmon’s and Soames’ Russellian
semantics (more specifically, the semantic content of simple sentences and the
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truth-conditions of belief reports) with coordination, ‘‘the very strongest relation of
synonymy or being semantically the same’’ (2007: 5). By performing this
manoeuvre, Fine aims
to defend a [Russellian] position within the philosophy of language. For
coordination can do much of the work of sense; and, by adopting a
relationalist view of coordination, the [Russellian philosopher] can secure
many of the advantages of the Fregean position without being committed to
the existence of sense. (2007: 5)
In this paper, my goal is to shed light on an undesirable result of semantic
relationism: a report like ‘‘Tom believes that Cicero is bald and Tom does not
believe that Tully is bald’’ is correct according to Fine’s provided truth-conditions
of belief reports, but its semantic content is (very likely) a contradiction. As I will
argue in the paper, even the resort to the notion of token proposition, introduced in
Fine’s recent article ‘‘Comments on Scott Soames’ ‘Coordination Problems’’’, does
not suffice to convincingly eliminate the contradiction; moreover, it raises new
difficulties.
My criticisms of Fine presuppose a presentation of his semantics, starting from
the key notion of coordination.
2 Coordination
Fine (2007: 39–40) characterizes coordination among proper names as follows.
Characterisation 1: Two co-referential token names (viz. two tokens of the
same name or two tokens of different but co-referential names) in a piece of
discourse are positively coordinated if and only if they represent their referent
as the same. This is in turn the case if and only if no (sincere, reflexive and
non-reticent) hearer/speaker who understands the discourse can sensibly raise
the question of whether their referent is the same. Two co-referential token
names in a piece of discourse are negatively coordinated if and only if they are
not positively coordinated.1
For example, suppose that you say (1) and (2). Independently of your knowing or
explicitly declaring that Cicero is Tully, a hearer who understands your piece of
discourse can sensibly raise the question of whether the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’
within it co-refer. Therefore, according to Characterisation 1, these names are
negatively coordinated.
(1) Cicero was an orator.
(2) Tully wrote the De Fato.
On the other hand, suppose that you say ‘‘Cicero was an orator and the same
Cicero was astute’’ or ‘‘Cicero was an orator and Cicero was also astute’’. The
1 Hoping to correctly understand the notion of coordination, I have added in Characterisation 1 the
second ‘only if’ to Fine’s (2007: 39–40) original formulation.
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presence of the linguistic particle ‘same’ or ‘also’ in this statement makes evident
your intention to use the two tokens of ‘Cicero’ in the same way (viz. as co-referring
tokens). Thus, no hearer who understands your piece of discourse would sensibly
question whether these tokens co-refer, to the effect that they will be positively
coordinated, according to Characterisation 1. It should be noted that two tokens of
‘Cicero’ are positively coordinated also when the presuppositions of the discourse
make clear that they are used in the same way; in this case, the presence in your
statement of the particle ‘same’ or ‘also’ is superfluous in order to yield positive
coordination.2
Besides Characterisation 1, Fine (2007: 43–50) also offers a second more
technical characterisation of the notion of coordination among names. Examination
of it might help the reader to better understand the intuitive Characterisation 1.
Characterisation 2: Two co-referential token names in a piece of discourse are
positively (i.e. non-negatively) coordinated if and only if they represent their
referent as the same. This is in turn the case if and only if they strictly co-refer,
i.e. if and only if it is a semantic requirement that they co-refer.
A semantic requirement is a semantic fact in a narrow sense. A fact, belonging to
the semantics of a given language L, is semantic in a narrow sense if ‘‘any rational
and reflective individual who understands L is […] in a position to know that the
fact obtains’’ (2007: 60). For example, the fact that the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’
co-refer is semantic in a broad but not narrow sense, because an English
[…] speaker may know that ‘Cicero’ refers to a particular person and know
that ‘Tully’ refers to a particular person without being in a position to know
that they are coreferential. (2007: 46)
Since the fact that ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ co-refer is not semantic in a narrow sense
then, according to Characterisation 2, ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ do not strictly co-refer,
with the result that they will be negatively coordinated. Instead, the two tokens of
the name ‘Cicero’ within the statement ‘‘Cicero was an orator and [the same] Cicero
was astute’’ are positively coordinated: the fact that these tokens co-refer is
available to all English speakers and therefore it is semantic in a narrow sense.
Besides cases of positive and negative coordination, in Fine’s semantics there is
also the possibility of having cases of uncoordination (i.e. neither positive nor
negative coordination). Suppose, for instance, that the statements ‘‘Cicero was an
orator’’ and ‘‘Cicero was astute’’ belong to different pieces of discourse. If so, we
cannot establish whether the two tokens of the name ‘Cicero’ in these statements are
positively or negatively coordinated: coordination is defined relative to one given
piece of discourse (see Characterisations 1 and 2), having its own presuppositions
and being produced by a speaker who has particular referential intentions.
2 On the contrary, if neither your statement contains particles like ‘same’, ‘also’ nor do the
presuppositions of the discourse make clear your intention to co-refer, a hearer of the statement ‘‘Cicero
was an orator and Cicero was astute’’ (in particular, one who knows that two famous Ciceros have
existed, the Roman orator and the German spy) may sensibly question whether the two tokens of ‘Cicero’
in this statement co-refer, consequently making coordination between them negative.
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Hence, ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ as belonging to separate/isolated statements are
uncoordinated (or not coordinated).3
3 Relational semantics of simple sentences
Having characterized the notion of coordination, let us now see what roles this
notion plays in Fine’s semantics. As a first important role, coordination contributes
to the semantic content of simple sentences/statements in the following way.4
Consider a simple sentence containing two co-referring terms. Fine (2007, Ch. 2,
§F) distinguishes between two semantic contents of this sentence: its primary
content, which is simply the Russellian proposition expressed by it; and its
secondary content, i.e. the coordinated proposition formed by its primary content
plus the relation of (positive or negative) coordination holding between the two
aforementioned co-referring terms.
For example, the primary content of sentence (3) is the Russellian proposition
(3p), while its secondary content is the negatively coordinated proposition (3p*),
formed by (3p) plus the relation of negative coordination, C-, holding between the
names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ in (3).
(3) Cicero admires Tully
(3p) \Cicero, Admiration, Cicero[
(3p*) \\Cicero, Admiration, Cicero[, C-[
The primary content of statement (4) is the same as that of (3), i.e. proposition
(3p), whereas its secondary content differs: it is the positively coordinated
proposition (4p*), formed by (3p) plus the relation of positive coordination, C?,
holding between the two tokens of the name ‘Cicero’ (used in the same way) within
statement (4).
(4) Cicero admires [the same] Cicero
(4p*) \\Cicero, Admiration, Cicero[, C?[
A simple sentence like (1) not containing co-referring names has solely primary
content, i.e. (1p), if it belongs to a piece of discourse which does not include,
besides ‘Cicero’ in (1), other terms referring to the individual Cicero.
(1p) \Cicero, Having been an orator[
3 Although Fine does not explicitly mention the coordination/uncoordination distinction (he generally
uses the terms ‘coordination’ and ‘uncoordination’ as synonyms of ‘positive’ and ‘negative coordination’
respectively), such a distinction—I think—implicitly emerges e.g. in the passages of Semantic
Relationism (2007: 93, 101) where, talking of the reports ‘‘Peter believes that Paderewski is musical’’
and ‘‘Peter believes that Paderewski is not musical’’, he distinguishes between the case in which these
reports are considered individually, in isolation (i.e. as belonging to different pieces of discourse, to the
effect that the two tokens of ‘Paderewski’ within them will be uncoordinated) and the case in which they
are taken as one pair of reports (and therefore as belonging to the same piece of discourse, with the result
that the two tokens of ‘Paderewski’ within such reports will be coordinated).
4 By simple sentence I mean ‘‘a sentence that does not contain any quotational, psychological, or other
obviously non-extensional linguistic contexts’’ (Braun and Saul 2002: 2).
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On the other hand, if (1) belongs to a piece of discourse which includes another
sentence about Cicero, e.g. (2), then the pair of sentences (1), (2) will express the
negatively coordinated pair of propositions (5), formed by the pair of Russellian
propositions expressed by (1) and (2) plus the relation of negative coordination
between the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ within these sentences.5
(5) \\\Cicero, Having been an orator[, \Cicero, Having written the De
Fato[[, C-[
4 Relational semantics of belief reports
Another important role coordination plays in Fine’s semantics is its contribution to
the Sufficient Conditions for the Correctness (SCC) of belief reports. Call the
conjunction of two belief reports composite report. Fine (2007: 102–5) distinguishes
among three different readings of a composite report containing two co-referring
terms: pure de re, weak de dicto and strict de dicto readings.
4.1 Sufficient conditions for the correctness of these three readings
Suppose that a subject S sincerely, on reflection and competently makes the
statements ‘a1 is F’ and ‘b1 is G’, where the token terms ‘a1’ and ‘b1’ co-refer. The
pure de re reading of the composite report ‘S believes that a2 is F and S believes
that b2 is G’ is correct if condition (i) (below) is satisfied. Its weak de dicto reading
is correct if conditions (i) and (ii) are jointly satisfied. Finally, its strict de dicto
reading is correct if conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are jointly satisfied.
(i) The (token) terms ‘a2’ and ‘b2’ have the same referent as respectively
‘a1’ and ‘b1’.
(ii) The two pairs of terms ‘a2’, ‘b2’ and ‘a1’, ‘b1’ are co-coordinated, i.e.
they are coordinated in the same way (both positively or both
negatively).
(iii) The two pairs of terms ‘a2’, ‘b2’ and ‘a1’, ‘b1’ are cross-coordinated, i.e.
‘a2’ is positively coordinated with ‘a1’ and ‘b2’ is positively coordinated
with ‘b1’.
For example, suppose that Tom, who fails to realize that Cicero is Tully,
sincerely asserts ‘‘Cicero is bald’’ and ‘‘Tully is not bald’’. Now, consider the
following composite reports:
(6) Tom believes that Cicero is bald and Tom believes that Tully is not bald;
(7) Tom believes that Tully is bald and Tom believes that Cicero is not bald;
(8) Tom believes that Cicero is bald and Tom believes that [the same] Cicero
is not bald.
5 The notions of coordinated proposition and coordinated pair of propositions are more sophisticated than
presented here: they involve a coordination-scheme (2007: 55–56) rather than a single coordination link.
However, for the objectives of this paper, the proposed characterisations of these notions suffice.
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The (pure) de re reading of reports (6)–(8) is correct, since condition (i) is satisfied:
the pairs of token names of Cicero contained in each report above have the same
referent as the token names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ contained in Tom’s statements
‘‘Cicero is bald’’ and ‘‘Tully is not bald’’. Incidentally, from the correctness of the
de re reading of (6)–(8) it emerges that, within this reading, co-referring names are
intersubstitutable salva veritate.
Under their weak de dicto reading, (6) and (7) are correct, since co-coordination,
i.e. condition (ii), also holds: the pairs ‘Cicero’, ‘Tully’ in (6) and ‘Tully’, ‘Cicero’
in (7) are both negatively coordinated, exactly as is the pair ‘Cicero’, ‘Tully’ in
Tom’s statements ‘‘Cicero is bald’’ and ‘‘Tully is not bald’’. On the contrary, there is
no reason to take the weak de dicto reading of (8) as correct: the pair of token names
(used in the same way) ‘Cicero’, ‘Cicero’ in (8), unlike the pair ‘Cicero’, ‘Tully’ in
Tom’s statements, are positively coordinated; therefore, co-coordination does not
hold.
As regards, finally, the strict de dicto reading of (6)–(8), only report (6) is correct
under this reading, since only in this report cross-coordination, i.e. condition (iii),
holds: the token of the name ‘Cicero’ in (6) is positively coordinated with its token
in Tom’s statement ‘‘Cicero is bald’’, and positive coordination also holds between
the two tokens of ‘Tully’ in (6) and in Tom’s statement ‘‘Tully is not bald’’.
4.2 Semantic content of the three readings
Fine does not say in a straightforward manner what the semantic content of a
composite report is. Nonetheless, his relational semantics of simple sentences (Sect.
3), the SCC assigned to composite reports (Sect. 4.1), his refusal of Fregean senses
and, finally, certain considerations he makes in his book (2007: 77) lead me to the
following conclusions.
Since, as we have seen, coordination plays no role within the SCC of the de re
reading of a composite report and co-referring names are intersubstitutable salva
veritate within this reading, it seems reasonable to claim that the de re reading of a
report like (6) or (7) or (8) simply expresses the Russellian proposition (6p).
(6p) \\Tom, B, \Cicero, Baldness[[, CONJ, \Tom, B, \\Cicero,
Baldness[, NEG[[[6
The SCC of the weak de dicto reading of a composite report crucially involve
coordination among terms included in the report; accordingly, this reading should
express a coordinated proposition. For example, the weak de dicto reading of (6) or
(7) will express the negatively coordinated proposition (6p*), where the relation C-
holds between the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ in either report.
(6p*) \\\Tom, B, \Cicero, Baldness[[, CONJ, \Tom, B, \\Cicero,
Baldness[, NEG[[[, C-[
As regards, finally, the strict de dicto reading of a composite report, we have seen
that its SCC involve coordination both among terms included in the report and with
6 CONJ is the relation of Conjunction and NEG is the property of Negation.
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terms outside the report which are contained in statements made by the believer.
Such a reading will therefore express a kind of proposition more sophisticated than a
Russellian or a coordinated proposition, which Fine calls token proposition.
5 Token propositions
According to Fine (2007, 54–55), ‘‘differences in ‘coordination’ among names show
up as differences in coordination among the objects to which they correspond’’. For
example, negative coordination between the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ in (3)
shows up as negative coordination between the two occurrences of the individual
Cicero in (3p*). On the other hand, positive coordination between the two token
names ‘Cicero’ in (4) shows up as positive coordination between the two
occurrences of the individual Cicero in (4p*).7 So, coordination, which is primarily
a relation among linguistic expressions, also derivatively holds among the ‘‘objects’’
(viz. occurrences of individuals, of properties, of relations within Russellian
propositions) for which these expressions stand. Taking for granted this, let us now
define the notion of token individual.
Characterisation 3: A token of an individual is an abstract object identified by
a class of occurrences of this individual within a given body of propositions,
such that every pair of occurrences belonging to the class is positively
coordinated and occurrence positively coordinated with an occurrence in the
class is also in the class.
Analogous characterisations can be provided for a token property and a token
relation. Finally, a token proposition is defined as a structured proposition whose
basic constituents are token individuals, token properties and token relations.8
As an example of a token proposition, consider a piece of discourse containing
the statements (1), (2) and (6), which expresses the body of Russellian
propositions (1p), (2p) and (6p). The token names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ in (6)
are negatively coordinated to one another and they are positively coordinated with
respectively ‘Cicero’ in (1) and ‘Tully’ in (2). Given this, the token individual
Cicero will be the abstract object identified by the set of positively coordinated
occurrences of Cicero including his occurrence in (1p) and his first occurrence in
(6p), while the token individual Tully will be the abstract object identified by the
set of positively coordinated occurrences of Cicero including his occurrence in
(2p) and his second occurrence in (6p). These two tokens of the individual Cicero
enter the token proposition that Tom believes that Cicero is bald and Tom believes
that Tully is not bald expressed by the strict de dicto reading of (6), to the effect
that Tom will believe and disbelieve (i.e. believe-false), at the strict de dicto level,
7 The notion of occurrence of a real individual could perplex the reader. Actually, although it is
implausible to maintain that a real individual has multiple occurrences in space–time, there seems to be
nothing wrong with the claim that such an individual has multiple occurrences in abstract objects, e.g. in
ordered sets or in Russellian propositions.
8 See Fine (2010: 479–80).
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two different token propositions, respectively that Cicero is bald and that Tully is
bald.
(2p) \Cicero, Having written the De Fato[
6 True contradictions
Unlike Salmon and other Russellian philosophers, Fine (2007: 138, n. 4) endorses
(at least in the cases which are relevant in this paper) the principle of Negative
Disquotation.
Negative Disquotation: If a non-reticent subject S does not have the
disposition to sincerely, on reflection and competently assert sentence ‘p’,
which lacks indexical or pronominal devices or ambiguities, or equivalently if
S has such a disposition towards ‘I do not believe that p’, then S does not
believe that p.9
It is rather evident that once this principle is accepted, the SCC of composite reports
of the form ‘S believes that a2 is F and S believes that b2 is G’ illustrated in Sect. 4.1
can be extended to composite reports (containing negative reports) of the form
‘S believes that a2 is F and S does not believe that b2 is G’, under the assumption
that S sincerely, on reflection and competently asserts ‘a1 is F’ (or equivalently ‘I
believe that a1 is F’) and ‘I do not believe that b1 is G’.
Now, suppose that Tom, who fails to realize that Cicero is Tully, sincerely asserts
‘‘Cicero is bald’’ and ‘‘I do not believe that Tully is bald’’. Also, consider the
composite report
(9) Tom believes that Cicero is bald and Tom does not believe that Tully is
bald
According to the SCC extended to composite reports containing negative reports,
Fine’s three readings of (9) are correct, since conditions (i)–(iii) (Sect. 4.1) are
satisfied: (i) the token names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ in (9) have the same referent
as the corresponding tokens in Tom’s abovementioned statements ‘‘Cicero is
bald’’ and ‘‘I do not believe that Tully is bald’’ (co-reference); (ii) the tokens
‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ in (9) are negatively coordinated, exactly as those in Tom’s
statements (co-coordination); (iii) the token of ‘Cicero’ in (9) is positively
coordinated with its token in Tom’s statement ‘‘Cicero is bald’’, and the token of
‘Tully’ in (9) is positively coordinated with its token in Tom’s statement ‘‘I do
not believe that Tully is bald’’ (cross-coordination). From the correctness of
these three readings of (9) violations of the principle of non-contradiction follow
at the level of their semantic content.
9 ‘S does not believe that p’ is nothing but the negation of ‘S believes that p’.
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6.1 De re and weak de dicto contradictions
In particular, taking for granted what was stated in Sect. 4.2 about the semantic
content of belief reports, the de re and weak de dicto readings of report (9) will
respectively express the true self-contradictory propositions (9p) and (9p*).10
(9p) \\Tom, B, \Cicero, Baldness[[, CONJ, \\Tom, B, \Cicero,
Baldness[[, NEG[[
(9p*) \\\Tom, B, \Cicero, Baldness[[, CONJ, \\Tom, B, \Cicero,
Baldness[[, NEG[[, C-[
6.2 Even strict de dicto contradiction?
The principle of non-contradiction seems to be safeguarded only at the level of the
content of the strict de dicto reading of (9), i.e. at the level of the token
proposition that Tom believes that Cicero is bald and Tom does not believe that
Tully is bald, provided that the token individuals Cicero and Tully entering this
proposition differ.
However, even at the strict de dicto level, a doubt arises. Consider a piece of
discourse including report (9) and no term referring to Cicero except for those
contained in (9). Since coordination has only been characterized among terms which
belong to the same piece of discourse (see Characterisations 1 and 2) and,
derivatively, among occurrences of objects within the body of Russellian
propositions expressed by such a piece of discourse, the token individual Cicero
will be identified, in this case, by the singleton containing the first occurrence of
Cicero in (9p), while the token individual Tully will be identified by the singleton
containing the second occurrence of Cicero in (9p). Now, if these are the tokens of
the individual Cicero entering the token proposition expressed by (9), I wonder how
such a proposition could significantly differ from the self-contradictory proposition
(9p)—I mean, if the Russellian proposition (9p) is self-contradictory despite its
containing two distinct occurrences of Cicero, then the token proposition expressed
by (9) should be self-contradictory as well despite its containing the singletons of
these occurrences; in other words, it is unclear to me how the move from talking of
occurrences to talking of singletons of the very same occurrences would eliminate
the contradiction.
10 In response to this objection of mine, Fine has claimed that (9p) and (9p*) are not genuine
contradictions. By contrast, the coordinated proposition formed by (9p) plus positive coordination
between the two occurrences of Cicero in (9p) is genuinely contradictory. This positively coordinated
proposition, which e.g. is expressed by the weak de dicto reading of ‘‘Tom believes that Cicero is bald
and Tom does not believe that [the same] Cicero is bald’’, is not true under our previous supposition that
Tom sincerely asserts ‘‘Cicero is bald’’ and ‘‘I do not believe that Tully is bald’’, since co-coordination
does not hold. My point, on the other hand, is that semantic relationism contains violations of the
standard principle of non-contradiction; and, undoubtedly, the true propositions (9p) and (9p*) are (or
incorporate) standard self-contradictions.
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7 Additional doubts about the notion of a token proposition
7.1 Drift towards Fregeanism
Fine (2007: 5) describes semantic relationism as ‘‘an attempt to defend a
[Russellian] position within the philosophy of language’’. On the other hand, once
the notion of token proposition is introduced in relational semantics, a cornerstone
of Russellianism, viz. the Millian thesis stating that proper names contribute to
propositions solely with their referent, is given up in belief reports and in simple
sentences (if simple sentences, besides primary and secondary contents, also have
tertiary content, i.e. also express a token proposition): as we saw in Sect. 5, within a
piece of discourse containing (1), (2) and (6), the (co-referring) names ‘Cicero’ and
‘Tully’ contribute to the token proposition expressed by the strict de dicto reading of
(6), as well as to those expressed by (1) and (2) (if any), with different objects viz.
with two tokens of the individual Cicero.
7.2 Infinite regress with semantic contents?
I already pointed out that, for Fine, positive or negative coordination among names
shows up as positive or negative coordination among the objects to which they
correspond (viz. occurrences of individuals, of properties, of relations within
Russellian propositions). Could coordination also hold among occurrences of the
same token object within token propositions? There seems to be no specific
contraindication to that. Thus, we could say that e.g. positive coordination between
‘Cicero’ and ‘Cicero’ in (4) shows up as positive coordination not only between the
occurrences of Cicero in (4p*) but also between the two occurrences of the very
same token of Cicero contained in the token proposition that Cicero admires
Cicero.
Now, using the notion of coordination among occurrences of the same token
individual, we might introduce a fourth level of content: if primary, secondary and
tertiary content are respectively Russellian propositions, coordinated propositions
and token propositions, the quaternary content will be a coordinated token
proposition, i.e. a structured proposition formed by the tertiary content (token
proposition) plus coordinative links among its constituents. For example, the
quaternary content of (4) will be the positively coordinated (token) proposition
formed by the token proposition that Cicero admires Cicero plus the relation of
positive coordination between the two occurrences of the token individual Cicero
within it.
Even this is not the end of the story: exactly as tertiary content (token
proposition) emerges from Russellian propositions plus coordinative links among
their constituents, a quinary content will emerge from token propositions plus
coordinative links among their constituents; this further content will be something
like a second-order token proposition, i.e. a structured proposition composed of
things identified by sets of positively coordinated occurrences of token objects.
Proceeding in this way, token propositions of higher and higher order could be
introduced.
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Now, if Fine is right in maintaining that a sentence has three contents—instead of
only one, the primary content, as e.g. Salmon (1986, 1989) claims—I wonder why
the number of contents assigned to the sentence should stop exactly at three instead
of going on ad infinitum.
7.3 True illogical belief?
The SCC introduced in Sect. 4.1 for composite reports can easily be extended to a
report of the form ‘S believes that Pa2b2’, e.g. (10), under the supposition that
S sincerely, on reflection and competently asserts a sentence of the form ‘Pa1b1’.
(10) Tom believes that Cicero is not Tully.
Now, consider a piece of discourse containing the statements (1), (2) and (10), and
suppose that Tom sincerely asserts ‘‘Cicero is not Tully’’. It could be shown that,
under its strict de dicto reading, report (10) is correct, since the conditions (i)–(iii)
(Sect. 4.1) are satisfied. The semantic content of this reading is the token proposition
that Tom believes that Cicero is not Tully, which contains two distinct tokens of the
individual Cicero: given the considered piece of discourse (and the corresponding
body of expressed Russellian propositions), the token individual Cicero will be
identified by the class of positively coordinated occurrences of Cicero including his
occurrence in (1p) and his first occurrence in the Russellian proposition expressed
by (10); the token individual Tully will be identified by the class of positively
coordinated occurrences of Cicero including his occurrence in (2p) and his second
occurrence in the Russellian proposition expressed by (10).
So, Tom believes, at the strict de dicto level, that one token individual Cicero
(viz. the token Cicero) is not identical to another token of the same individual (viz.
the token Tully). Since—as we have just seen—these two token individuals differ,
Tom’s belief (at the strict de dicto level) is true. This result clashes with the
indisputable fact that the belief that Cicero is not Tully is false, impossible and
illogical.
8 Conclusion
Fine’s change of his original project from Russellianism enriched with coordination
into a new sophisticated kind of Fregeanism involving token propositions does not
really allow him to safeguard the principle of non-contradiction within his relational
semantics; in addition, the notion of token proposition is problematic in some
respects.
Actually, Fine could eliminate the true contradictions from his theory by taking
Salmon’s (1986, 1989) route and rejecting Negative Disquotation, to the effect that
a report like (9) (which, at different levels, expresses self-contradictory proposi-
tions) would come out incorrect. On the other hand, both in his works and in face-to-
face conversations, Fine has manifested strong disinclination towards this proposal,
which, according to him, introduces a counterintuitive ‘‘asymmetry’’—on the one
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hand, e.g. Tom’s sincere, on reflection and competent assertion of ‘‘Cicero is bald’’
(or of ‘‘I believe that Cicero is bald’’) suffices to ascribe to Tom the belief that
Cicero is bald; on the other hand, his assertion (made under the same conditions) of
‘‘I do not believe that Tully is bald’’ does not authorize us to conclude that Tom
does not believe that Tully is bald, contra Negative Disquotation.
It goes without saying that my doubts about semantic relationism do not take
anything away from the extraordinary interest and value of Fine’s theory.
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